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The Confidence Elite

The Economist reports about a study on firms’ recruitment policies and interprets the results of the study as a “guide on how to join the global elite.” Here is what it takes:

  • Intelligence and diligence: Ideally documented by a degree from a US Ivy League college, Oxford or Cambridge.
  • Sophistication and smartness: A job in consulting, ideally with McKinsey or the Boston Consulting Group; with a big law firm; or in investment banking, ideally with Goldman Sachs. To land such a job, one needs to impress and convince one’s future colleagues (the actual consultants, lawyers or bankers are interviewing, not the human resources department). And this requires a sense of immediate camaraderie:

    … they behave predictably: they follow a set script, starting with some ice-breaking chit-chat, then asking you about yourself, then setting a work-related problem. That makes them desperate for relief from the tedium. Be vivacious. Hang on their every word. And flatter their self-image as “the best of the best” and the most jet-lagged of the jet-lagged.

  • “Fit:” Diversity is attractive, but only a little bit of it. The recruiters are looking for people to work and socialize with (think of all the evenings in airport lounges). Similarities help.

    This overwhelming emphasis on style rather than substance may seem an odd way to select members of the 1%. But those at the top of the consulting, investment-banking and legal professions know that the most prized possession in uncertain times is not brainpower, but self-confidence. For all the talk of the world becoming dominated by a “cognitive elite”, in reality it appears it is nothing more than a “confidence elite”.

In the same issue, The Economist reports about research to show that the “strength of [one’s] handshake predicts the length of … life.” Confidence, it seems, makes you healthy and successful.

Update (25 May 2015)

In the FT, Gillian Tett also discussed the study. She wrote:

… Nor is an Ivy League education sufficient per se. Instead, what these companies are looking for in the interview process is what they often describe as “polish” or “pedigree” — as evidenced in thousands of tiny social cues and cultural patterns. … In theory, this “pedigree” is meant to reflect individual merit and talent; in practice, though, it is hard for students to engage in extracurricular activity unless they come from an elite background to start with.

“Working-class students are more likely to enter college with the notion that the purpose of higher education is learning in the classrooms, and invest their time and energy accordingly,” Rivera observes. “But the [fact that] these students focus on academic rather than extra-curriculum pursuits adversely affects their job prospects,” she adds, describing how time and again the people interviewing candidates for jobs made decisions based on subjective issues such as whether a candidate had “polish”, “breadth” — and “pedigree”.

Princeton University Press’ website of the book.

Fintech Competition for Banks

In a series of articles, The Economist reports about technology companies that compete with traditional banks in areas ranging from lending to payments and wealth management.

The introductory article refers to AngelList and references reports by Goldman Sachs (The Future of Finance, copy posted here), BCG and Accenture. And it highlights two factors driving the structural change which I have also emphasized in a recent article: Technology and vanishing trust in banks. The other articles cover:

Updates—some more firms in the business:

CreditGate24.

Debt Supercycle rather than Secular Stagnation

In a Vox column, Ken Rogoff argues that the world economy experiences a “debt supercycle” rather than the onset of secular stagnation in the West.

Rogoff argues that macroeconomic developments since the financial crisis are in line with historical experience, as documented in his book “This Time is Different” (with Carmen Reinhart): A large fall in output followed by a sluggish recovery; deleveraging; protracted higher unemployment; and a strong rise of the government debt quota are typical after a boom and bust of house prices and credit.

According to Rogoff, policy makers should have implemented more heterodox policies including debt write-downs; bank restructurings coupled with recapitalisations; and temporarily higher inflation targets. Rogoff supports the (in his view, orthodox) fiscal policy responses that were adopted but criticizes that many countries tightened prematurely.

Rogoff acknowledges that secular forces shape the macroeconomy, in particular population ageing; the stabilization of the female labor force participation rate; the growth slowdown in Asia; and the slowdown or acceleration (?) of technological progress. But

[t]he debt supercycle model matches up with a couple of hundred years of experience of similar financial crises. The secular stagnation view does not capture the heart attack the global economy experienced; slow-moving demographics do not explain sharp housing price bubbles and collapses.

Rogoff doesn’t accept low interest rates as an argument in favor of the secular stagnation view. Rather than reflecting demand deficiencies, low interest rates (if measured correctly—Rogoff expects a utility based interest rate measure to be higher) could reflect regulation (favoring low-risk borrowers and “knocking out other potential borrowers who might have competed up rates”) and to some extent central bank policies.

Rogoff argues that the global stock market boom poses a problem for the secular stagnation view. He proposes changed perceptions about the likelihood and cost of extreme events (Barro, Weitzman) as factors to explain both low real interest rates and the stock market boom (after an initial asset price collapse during the crisis).

Regarding policy prescriptions to expand public investment in light of the low interest rates, Rogoff notes that

it is highly superficial and dangerous to argue that debt is basically free. To the extent that low interest rates result from fear of tail risks a la Barro-Weitzman, one has to assume that the government is not itself exposed to the kinds of risks the market is worried about, especially if overall economy-wide debt and pension obligations are near or at historic highs already. [Moreover] one has to worry whether higher government debt will perpetuate the political economy of policies that are helping the government finance debt, but making it more difficult for small businesses and the middle class to obtain credit.

Rogoff considers rising inequality to be problematic (and a possible factor for higher savings rates):

Tax policy should be used to address these secular trends, perhaps starting with higher taxes on urban land, which seems to lie at the root of inequality in wealth trends

He concludes that the case for a debt supercycle is stronger than for secular stagnation:

[T]he US appears to be near the tail end of its leverage cycle, Europe is still deleveraging, while China may be nearing the downside of a leverage cycle.

Sovereign Money in Iceland?

Iceland is considering fundamental monetary reform. A report (PDF) by Frosti Sigurjónsson, Member of Parliament, discusses problems under the current fractional reserve system as well as possible alternatives. The report was commissioned by the prime minister (website of the Prime Minister’s office).

The report argues that the Central Bank of Iceland lost control over the money supply. Commercial banks lent pro-cyclically; they effectively forced the Central Bank to provide base money when needed; the Central Bank’s interest rate policy didn’t suffice to keep the growth of broad monetary aggregates in check; money creation by commercial banks shifted seignorage revenue from the Central Bank to commercial banks; and the deposit insurance accompanying the fractional reserve system encouraged risky lending, distorted competition and gave way to taxpayer funded bailouts when systemic banks collapsed.

The report discusses the Sovereign Money proposal (Fischer 1930s; Huber and Robertson 2000; Dyson and Jackson 2013) according to which all physical and electronic money is created by the Central Bank; commercial banks administer transaction payments and serve as intermediaries; new money is brought into circulation by way of transfers from the Central Bank to the Treasury; and the Central Bank may also lend funds to commercial banks which in turn lend these funds to businesses.

The report recommends that either the Central Bank proactively enforces credit controls or, preferably, that money power is secured with the state owned Central Bank (p. 17). The report recommends to commission a feasibility study of the implementation of the Sovereign Money proposal in Iceland.

The report also discusses narrow banking proposals (see my earlier posts here, here or here) and Laurence Kotlikoff’s Limited Purpose Banking model (see my earlier post here).

Concerning the Sovereign Money proposal, I remain favorable as far as the analysis of the problem is concerned but rather skeptical regarding the proposed solution. In particular, I remain very skeptical as to whether a Sovereign Money regime could be enforced at all. I have previously described and evaluated the Swiss version of the Sovereign Money proposal—the “Vollgeldinitiative.” And I have made an alternative proposal for monetary reform (see also here).

Vinča

A few miles east of today’s Belgrade lies a Vinča settlement that dates back to 5000 BC. The Vinča civilization relied on fishing, farming and mining (copper); the Vinča people built houses along streets; and they exchanged goods. They also used an early form of proto-writing (sources: Belgrade tourism site, Wikipedia).

Alex Whitaker writes on his site Ancient Wisdom:

In 1908, the largest prehistoric Neolithic settlement in Europe was discovered in the village of Vinca, just a few miles from the Serbian capital Belgrade, on the shores of the Danube. Vinca was excavated between 1918 and 1934 and was revealed as a civilisation in its own right. Indeed, as early as the 6th millennium BC, three millennia before Dynastic Egypt, the Vinca culture was already a fully fledged civilisation. A typical town consisted of houses with complex architectural layouts and several rooms, built of wood that was covered in mud. The houses sat along streets, thus making Vinca the first urban settlement in Europe, but being far older than the cities of Mesopotamia and Egypt. And the town of Vinca itself was just one of several metropolises, with others at Divostin, Potporanj, Selevac, Plocnik and Predionica.

Apostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou’s “Logicomix”

“Logicomix: An Epic Search for Truth” (Wikipedia) is a nice graphic novel by Apostolos Doxiadis and Christos Papadimitriou about Bertrand Russell’s life and work. Whitehead, Frege, Poincaré, Hilbert, Wittgenstein, Gödel, von Neumann and many others as well as Greek tragedy make appearances.

Capital Flows To and From Switzerland

In a Vox column, Pinar Yeşin argues that

abnormally low values of net flows were not necessarily driven by surges of private capital inflows. In fact, declined capital outflows that are less correlated with capital inflows appear to be the main factor. These findings suggest that the financial crisis generated a breaking point for capital flows to and from Switzerland.

“Notenbankgeld für Alle? (Reserves for Everyone?),” NZZ, 2015

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 20, 2015. PDF, HTML. Ökonomenstimme, February 24, 2015. HTML.

  • Allowing the general public to hold reserves at the central bank could help reduce the risk of bank runs and the negative consequences of deposit insurance.
  • It would end the need to accept bank deposits as means of payment although they are not legal tender; this need arises due to prohibitions on cash payments, for tax reasons.
  • But it could also have negative consequences: Money and credit creation by banks would be undermined, with social costs and benefits.
  • Price stability and financial stability could be threatened during the transition period.
  • More technical questions would have to be addressed as well: They concern the payment system or the conduct of monetary policy.
  • Proposals to go further and to abolish cash are not convincing. One suggested benefit—more leeway for monetary policy makers—is over estimated: Negative rates can also be engineered (effectively) through fiscal policy, and they can fully be implemented with a flexible exchange rate between reserves and cash.
  • Another suggested benefit—better monitoring of tax dodgers and criminals—is also overrated; the fixed cost to circumvent the measure would deter minor illegal activity but not major one.
  • But abolishing cash would have severe negative consequences for privacy and could negatively affect financial literacy.
  • Enforcing an abolishment of cash would be difficult. In a free society, any reform to the monetary system is constrained by the requirement that money must remain attractive for its users.

Non-Neutral Helicopter Drops

In an August 2014 Economics article, Willem Buiter discussed the conditions for a Friedman-type helicopter drop of money to be effective.

First, there must be benefits from holding fiat base money other than its pecuniary rate of return. Only then will base money be willingly held despite being dominated as a store of value … Second, fiat base money is irredeemable: it is view[ed] as an asset by the holder but not as a liability by the issuer. … Third, the price of money is positive.

Deflation … are therefore unnecessary. They are policy choices. This effectiveness result holds when the economy is away from the zero lower bound (ZLB), at the ZLB for a limited time period or at the ZLB forever.

The feature of irredeemable base money that is key … is that the acceptance of payment in base money by the government to a private agent constitutes a final settlement … It leaves the private agent without any further claim on the government, now or in the future. The helicopter money drop effectiveness issue is closely related to the question as to whether State-issued fiat money is net wealth for the private sector, despite being technically an ‘inside asset’ …

… because of its irredeemability, state-issued fiat money is indeed net wealth to the private sector … even after the intertemporal budget constraint of the State (which includes the Central Bank) has been consolidated with that of the household sector.

Forecasting Exchange Rates

In a Vox column, Michele Ca’Zorzi, Jakub Mućk and Michał Rubaszek argue that exploiting the “Rogoff’s consensus” helps beat the random walk forecast.

… a calibrated half-life PPP model beats overwhelmingly the random walk in relation to real exchange rate forecasting.

… if the speed of mean reversion is estimated, rather than calibrated, the model performs significantly worse than the random walk due to estimation error.

… the mean reverting nature of real exchange rates can be exploited to outperform the random walk in relation to nominal exchange rate forecasting. For both the case of the euro and the dollar we find that the nominal exchange rate has contributed to the mean reversion process of the real exchange rate rather than just followed a random walk.

The Purple Plans

Laurence Kotlikoff appeals to “fellow economists and concerned citizens” to endorse plans for

Fed and Treasury Maturity Policies

In a recent paper, Robin Greenwood, Sam Hanson, Josh Rudolph and Larry Summers discuss the joint effect of Fed and Treasury policy on the maturity structure of government liabilities in the hands of the private sector. John Cochrane commends the paper in a blog post.

Greenwood, Hanson, Rudolph and Summers make several points. First, “monetary and fiscal policies have been pushing in opposite directions in recent years.” In spite of QE, long-term government debt held by the private sector increased, mostly due to government deficits but also because the government lengthened the maturity of its debt. Second, Fed and Treasury policies largely are uncoordinated. They argue that this is suboptimal, in particular when the Fed strongly intervenes as it did in the recent QE episodes.

The Federal Reserve has focused purely on the effects that its bond purchases were expected to have on long-term interest rates and, by extension, the economy more broadly. … it completely ignored any possible impact on government fiscal risk, even though the Federal Reserve’s profits and losses are remitted to the Treasury. Conversely, Treasury’s debt management announcements and the advice of the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee (TBAC) have focused on the assumed benefits of extending the average debt maturity from a fiscal risk perspective, and largely ignored the impact of policy changes on long-term yields. To the extent that the Federal Reserve and Treasury ever publicly mention the other institution’s mandate, it is usually in the context of avoiding the perception that one institution might be helping the other achieve an objective. Specifically, the Fed does not want to be seen as monetizing deficits, while the Treasury has been reluctant to acknowledge the Fed as anything more than a large investor.

Third, they argue that from a consolidated government policy perspective, the optimal debt maturity structure is rather short. This saves on interest payments to the private sector (on average) and reduces “liquidity transformation” by the financial sector with dangerous consequences for financial stability. They downplay the risk sharing benefits of longer-term debt and argue that short-term debt has additional advantages at the zero lower bound.

Pages 11-12 contain the following figure, among others:

11

Income-Group Specific Trends in CPI Inflation

Tyler Cowen points out in a blog post that price increases adjusted for changes in quality have differed substantially across product categories. Depending on the basket of goods and services one wishes to consider this gives rise to large differences in measured CPI inflation. Cowen suggests that low-income households experienced much stronger CPI increases for their relevant basket than high-income households. In other words, the commonly reported increase in income inequality severely underestimates the effective rise.

Debt Sustainability

The considerations guiding the IMF’s debt sustainability analysis which crucially determines the Fund’s lending policy is explained on an IMF website.

The DSA framework is in place since 2002. It has three objectives: To assess the current state; identify vulnerabilities; and examine alternative debt stabilising policies. Both total public and total external debt are analysed. Market-access countries and low-income countries are distinguished. These charts and tables summarise the DSA indicators for a market-access country. An example of the DSA is at display on page 41 in the September 2014 report on Italy.

Pari Passu and Collective Action Clauses: The New World

An IMF staff report published in September and entitled “Strengthening the Contractual Framework to Address Collective Action Problems in Sovereign Debt Restructuring” discusses recent legal developments of relevance for sovereign debt markets and implications for the sovereign debt restructuring process.

The New York court decisions (NML Capital, Ltd v. Republic of Argentina) have rendered a holdout strategy more likely to succeed. This tends to exacerbate collective action problems and raises the risk of more protracted debt restructuring processes. Market participants, including the International Capital Markets Association (ICMA) are discussing contractual clarifications and modifications in response to this challenge. The IMF observes these discussions and supports the preliminary results.

The New York court decisions established a broader interpretation of the standard pari passu clause in sovereign debt contracts. Specifically, they extended the standard notion of “protection of a creditor from legal subordination of its claims in favor of another creditor” to the broader notion that a sovereign must pay creditors on a pro rata basis. The court decisions prohibited Argentina from making payments to holders of restructured bonds unless it paid holdout creditors on a pro rata basis, and it prevented banks from making payments on Argentina’s behalf. In this context, the decisions also interpret the U.S. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act. The scope of the rulings is not clear, not least because the decisions also refer to Argentina’s “course of conduct.” If interpreted broadly, the court decisions change the legal framework and are likely to complicate the restructuring of New York law-governed debt contracts (while probably not affecting London law-governed contracts).

Box 1 of the report discusses in detail the history of the Argentine litigation in the U.S. The report also contains an annex on the history of pari passu clauses in New York law-governed sovereign debt contracts.

Sovereign issuers have already reacted to the court decisions, by modifying the pari passu clauses in debt contracts. Also, ICMA has proposed a new standard pari passu clause, emphasising equal ranking as opposed to pro rata payments.

Collective action clauses enable a qualified majority of bondholders (e.g., 75%) of a specific bond issuance to bind the minority to the terms of a restructuring agreement. If collective action clauses operate on a series-by-series basis rather than on the total stock of debt then a blocking minority can more easily be formed and a strategy of holding out is more likely to succeed, in particular in light of the recent New York court decisions. The possibility to aggregate claims across bond series for voting purposes works in the opposite direction. Some countries have included aggregation clauses in the debt contracts, and the ESM treaty requires standardised aggregation clauses (“Euro CACs”) in Euro area government bonds as well. These clauses feature a “two limb” voting structure, requiring a majority of bondholders in each series and across all series but a lower quorum (e.g., 66%). Currently, “single limb” procedures are being discussed. These would solely require a majority across all series. To prevent abuse, such single limb procedures would have to be accompanied by safeguards that ensure inter-creditor equity, in particular a restriction to offer all affected bondholders the same (menu of) instruments. (Offering the same (menu of) instruments would generally imply that some creditors suffer larger restructuring losses than others, depending on the type of instruments they held initially. But already today, this is common and generally accepted.)

Box 2 of the report discusses the history of collective action clauses. Box 3 of the report discusses disenfranchisement provisions. Their purpose is to limit the risk of a sovereign manipulating voting processes by influencing votes of entities under its control.

Maturity Extension as Precondition for Large-Scale IMF Financing Operations?

An IMF staff report published in May and entitled “The Fund’s Lending Framework and Sovereign Debt—Preliminary Considerations” proposes to drop an exemption related to systemic importance and to give a larger role to debt maturity extensions.

Prior to 2002, when a member state sought funds in excess of established limits, the Fund often waived these limits on the basis of “exceptional circumstances,” and did so in a discretionary manner. Growing concerns over the problems this may create (moral hazard, early exit of private creditors, delays in necessary debt reduction measures, large-scale Fund financing operations) and the Argentinian collapse of 2001 triggered a review that gave rise to the 2002 exceptional access framework.

This required as a precondition for Fund support that debt be sustainable with a high probability. Whenever debt sustainability was clearly not given or remained in doubt, the framework called for debt restructuring with the aim to render the remaining debt sustainable. In retrospect, this restructuring requirement is viewed as too inflexible since it generates restructuring costs even when it turns out ex post that a restructuring was not actually needed.

During the Euro area crises, the Fund did not judge debt sustainability of the most affected countries to be very likely and the exceptional access framework of 2002 therefore would have required a debt restructuring as a precondition for IMF funding. However, pointing to high risks of international systemic spillovers of a debt restructuring, the Fund waived in 2010 the requirement that debt had to be sustainable with a high probability. By now, this modification of the exceptional access framework is also seen as unsatisfactory because systemic exemption structurally favors large member states and does not address the problems that gave rise to the 2002 framework. Against this background, a reform proposal is put forward.

The reform proposal is guided by two objectives: To improve debt service capacity without imposing debt reduction as a prerequisite; and to avoid that private sector claims are fully honored while debt sustainability remains in doubt. According to the proposal, the IMF would require as precondition for funding that measures are taken to improve debt sustainability even if they do not necessarily restore sustainability with high probability. Chief among those measures, the proposal suggests that creditors should be asked to agree on a maturity extension (re-profiling). That is, private creditors would remain exposed to the default risk and would be forced to contribute to the refinancing.

Collective action clauses might be needed to win creditors over. For a majority of them to be voluntarily participating, they must perceive the maturity extension as likely leading to renewed market access of the sovereign. Even in the absence of a payment default, re-profiling would likely trigger a credit event if collective action clauses were activated, and a credit downgrade among rating agencies.

Perspectives on the Financial Crisis

A Hoover Press book edited by Martin Baily and John Taylor collects articles about the financial crisis. The contributions in “Across the Great Divide: New Perspectives on the Financial Crisis” include (with links to PDF files):