Tag Archives: European Central Bank

Conference on “The Macroeconomic Implications of Central Bank Digital Currencies,” CEPR/ECB, 2023

Conference jointly organized by CEPR’s RPN FinTech & Digital Currencies and the European Central Bank. Welcome speech by Piero Cippolone, keynote by Fabio Panetta.

Organizers: Toni Ahnert, Katrin Assenmacher, Massimo Ferrari Minesso, Peter Hoffmann, Arnaud Mehl, Dirk Niepelt.

CEPR’s conference website. ECB’s website with videos. Website with pictures.

“Why the Digital Euro Might be Dead on Arrival,” VoxEU, 2023

With Cyril Monnet. VoxEU, August 10, 2023. HTML.

… promoting the digital euro requires an aggressive marketing strategy because private incentives for adoption are limited. However, the pursuit of such an aggressive approach is unlikely as this runs counter to the ECB’s fourth, implicit objective of protecting banks’ existing business model.

This is problematic and could turn the project into a significant missed opportunity, for the potential social benefits of the digital euro substantially exceed its private ones.

“Der digitale Euro könnte zur Totgeburt werden (Digital Euro, Dead on Arrival?),” NZZ, 2023

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, July 5, 2023. PDF. HTML.

Ein digitaler Euro könnte den Wettbewerb fördern, mehr Transparenz schaffen und das Too-big-to-fail-Problem entschärfen. Mit ihrer Minimalvariante aber priorisiert die EZB das Ziel der Bewahrung des Status quo im Bankensystem.

“Digital Euro: An Assessment of the First Two Progress Reports,” SUERF, 2023

SUERF Policy Brief 612, June 2023. HTML, PDF.

Executive summary:

The ECB’s first two progress reports on the digital euro clarify the project teams’ considerations. Some motivations for a digital euro remain vague, some fundamental tradeoffs receive limited attention. Most importantly, the reports lack an analysis of why digital euro holdings as stores of value are not desirable and whether strategies to limit such holdings cause collateral damage. Against that backdrop some of the design choices backed by the Governing Council appear premature.

“Digital Euro: An Assessment of the First Two Progress Reports,” European Parliament, 2023

European Parliament, April 2023. PDF.

Executive summary:

The two progress reports provide an insightful overview over some of the thinking underlying the digital euro project. The reports remain vague in some respects, which is not surprising given the early stage of the project and the division of tasks between the ECB and the Commission.

The first report suggests that the digital euro can help preserve public money as the anchor of the payment system, but it does not explain how the decline in cash use endangers the anchor role or how a digital euro would mitigate the associated risks. It motivates the digital euro as contributing to Europe’s strategic autonomy, but does not clarify whether the autonomy concerns national security, cheaper payment services, or monetary sovereignty, and why either of these would suggest a focus on consumers rather than business users. More generally, the report discusses few economic motives for a digital euro in depth and this raises doubts about the proper sequencing of design choices. Some arguments for privacy restrictions are not fully convincing. The most important shortcoming of the first report is the lack of analysis of why digital euro holdings as stores of value are not desirable (or why this issue is beyond discussion) and whether strategies to limit such holdings cause collateral damage.

The second report lacks a discussion of incentive compatibility of the envisioned public-private partnership model. It also lacks detail on the proposed settlement, funding and defunding models and on the incidence of the payment scheme’s costs.

The reports do not discuss implications for central bank balance sheets, interest rates, political interference, and the ECB’s mandate to introduce a digital euro.

My colleague Cyril Monnet also wrote a report (PDF). His executive summary:

Since Facebook’s announcement of Libra in July 2019, central banks, including the European Central Bank (ECB), have accelerated investigations on the introduction of their own retail digital currency.

This study analyses the two reports published by the ECB regarding its investigation for the introduction of a digital euro.

The digital euro can offer many advantages over existing means of payment. However, most of these benefits, as outlined in the two reports, are of a systemic and social nature, rather than being benefits for users.

A broad acceptance and usage of the digital euro requires that it brings benefits not only to consumers but also to merchants. The digital euro needs a platform business model that brings consumers but also incentivises merchants to adopt it.

In addition, considering the social benefits it brings, the ECB should design the digital euro to promote its appeal. The ECB should consider eliminating holding limits and discontinuing penalising remuneration schemes as soon as possible after its introduction. Also, the ECB should consider adding some programmability features to the digital euro.

There are also some challenges ahead.

The deployment of the digital euro by regulated intermediaries results in a conflict of interest, as the digital euro competes with a significant source of their revenue, i.e. payments. To restrict the fees charged to users of the digital euro by intermediaries, the ECB should consider implementing a transparent fee structure that may incorporate subsidies.

Also, while consumers use cash to preserve their anonymity, the digital euro will always leave a data trail. It is therefore key that the future design of the digital euro preserves at least the privacy of its users, which may require the central bank to make compromises with some other objectives.

It is not clear that distributed ledger technology (DLT) is the best way to deploy the digital euro but making it DLT compatible and programmable can foster innovations in decentralised finance.

Update, late May 2023: Christian Hofmann also wrote a report (PDF). His executive summary:

… This paper argues that the paramount reason for introducing a digital euro should lie in the imperfections of the existing money landscape that offers the public suboptimal choices for store of value and payment transactions. In that respect, the introduction of a digital euro holds great promise for the public, and this paper focuses on one of the most essential design features of a digital euro. The European Central Bank (ECB) plans to introduce a limited version of a digital euro that would cap the maximum amounts of digital euros that individuals can hold, but this paper challenges the ECB’s assumption that such caps are needed in the interest of financial stability. The concerns voiced by the ECB and other central banks about the risks from sudden outflows of liquidity from bank deposits to CBDC are realistic, but this paper argues that these risks are manageable and that a digital euro might even support financial stability in a banking crisis. Properly implemented, an unlimited digital euro would allow central banks and other authorities to wield control more effectively during bank run scenarios and improve their overall ability to manage crises situations. 

Monetary Policy, the NK Model, and Humility

In an NBER working paper John Cochrane concludes that

… we have been guilty of playing with too-complex models when we don’t really understand basics, such as stability, determinacy, and the frictionless limit. …

Given the state of actual agreed-on knowledge, central banks’ proclamations of detailed technocratic ability to manipulate delicate frictions is laughable. Figure 10 shows in chart form the Rube-Goldberg list of mechanisms the ECB thinks it understands and can manipulate. Central bankers who think they have any idea how all these boxes and arrows work, and how to manipulate them, should reread Bob’s unsung classic “on a report to the OECD” Lucas (1979) once a week. A little humility would do us all good.

Fabio Panetta on the Digital Euro

In a speech, the ECB’s Fabio Panetta argues that a digital Euro is necessary because

[i]n the digital age … banknotes could lose their role as a reference value in payments, undermining the integrity of the monetary system. Central banks must therefore consider how to ensure that their money can remain a payments anchor in a digital world.

He argues that

outsourcing the provision of central bank money [to stable coin providers] … would endanger monetary sovereignty [as would the absence of a national digital currency].

Panetta also argues that a digital Euro could

  • improve the confidentiality of digital payments and
  • increase choice and reduce costs

and should

  • avoid interfering with the functioning of the financial system and
  • be available within private payment solutions.

Panetta does not discuss

  • seignorage and
  • time consistency motivations.

“CBDC: Considerations, Projects, Outlook,” CEPR/VoxEU, 2021

CEPR eBook, November 24, 2021. HTML.

VoxEU, November 24, 2021. HTML.

Retail central bank digital currency has morphed from an obscure fascination of technophiles and monetary theorists into a major preoccupation of central bankers. Pilot projects abound and research on the topic has exploded as private sector initiatives such as Libra/Diem have focused policymakers’ minds and taken the status quo option off the table. In this eBook, academics and policymakers review what we know about the economic, legal, and political implications of CBDC, discuss current projects, and look ahead.

Doves and Hawks at the ECB

In the FAZ, Christian Siedenbiedel discusses a ZEW study on the positions of ECB board members and how they relate to national debt levels.

Es gibt klare Fraktionen von „Falken“ und „Tauben“ im Rat, und es gibt eine gewisse Korrelation zur Höhe der Staatsschulden im jeweiligen Heimatland des Ratsmitglieds. Als „Tauben“ wurden nach der Daten-Auswertung die Ratsmitglieder Ignazio Visco (Italien), Pablo Hernández de Cos (Spanien), François Villeroy de Galhau (Frankreich), Giannis Stournaras (Griechenland und Mario Centeno (Portugal) eingestuft. Auf der anderen Seite bestehe die klare „Falken“-Fraktion aus Jens Weidmann (Deutschland), Robert Holzmann (Österreich), Klaas Knot (Niederlande), Pierre Wunsch (Belgien) und Martins Kazaks (Lettland).

Die Klassifizierung der EZB-Direktoriumsmitglieder, die ebenfalls dem Rat angehören, zeige ein gemischteres Muster, heißt es in der Studie. So vertrat beispielsweise Isabel Schnabel (Deutschland) eine gemäßigtere Position als ihr deutscher Kollege im Gremium, Bundesbankpräsident Jens Weidmann. Das umgekehrte Muster gelte für Spanien, wo der Vizepräsident Luis de Guindos gemäßigter sei als sein eher „taubenhaft“ eingestellter Kollege, der Notenbankchef Hernandez de Cos. EZB-Präsidentin Christine Lagarde wird in der Studie als „Taube“ eingestuft, da sie sich auf die Fortführung des PEPP konzentriere und alle Arten von Debatten über einen vorzeitigen Ausstieg, die von der Falkenfraktion kämen, strikt ablehne. „Obwohl für sechs Ratsmitglieder nur unzureichende Daten zur Verfügung standen, deutet unsere Kategorisierung darauf hin, dass es im EZB-Rat eine Mehrheit von Tauben gibt“, heißt es in der Studie. …

Die Taubenfraktion im Rat kommt auf eine durchschnittliche Schuldenquote in ihren Heimatländern von 133 Prozent, fast dem Doppelten der Falkenfraktion mit 71 Prozent. Den Zusammenhang haben die Wissenschaftler dann noch statistisch abgesichert. „Unser Ergebnis zeigt eine klare Korrelation zwischen heimischer Staatsverschuldung und Positionierung“, sagt Studienautor Friedrich Heinemann.

German Banks Send Mixed Signals on Digital Euro

In the FAZ, Christian Siedenbiedel reports that Deutsche Bank questions whether a digital Euro as envisioned by the ECB (i.e., with tight quantity restrictions) would be successful:

Die Argumentation geht so: Die EZB will den digitalen Euro einführen, um auf den verstärkten Währungswettbewerb zu antworten. … Um sich vor solchem Machtverlust sowohl durch Digitalgeld von anderen Notenbanken („Krypto-Dollars“) als auch durch privates Digitalgeld („Global Stable Coins“) zu schützen, treibe die EZB den Digitaleuro voran. Also aus längerfristigen politischen Motiven. Dabei sei unklar, ob der digitale Euro sich international am Markt durchsetzen könne und ob die Menschen in der Eurozone dafür überhaupt Bedarf hätten. “Das Design des digitalen Euros, soweit bisher bekannt, lässt erwarten, dass die potentiellen Nutzer kaum einen Unterschied zu bestehenden Bezahloptionen erkennen werden”.

Update: From the dbresearch document prepared by Heike Mai:

Lifting the limits on how much each user can hold would change the situation entirely, allowing a massive outflow of bank deposits into the digital euro. As a result, lending decisions and money creation would shift from the decentralised, privately owned banking sector to a central, state-run authority: the ECB. In this case, Europe would face the fundamental question of which type of monetary and financial system it wants. The answer to that would have to come from democratically elected representatives.

The German Banking Industry Committee sees a central role for the digital Euro, however, according to a new paper:

In a policy paper, the German Banking Industry Committee (GBIC) for the first time sets out detailed thoughts on the design of a “digital euro”. In this paper, experts from Germany’s five national banking associations draw up an ecosystem of innovative forms of money that extends far beyond the idea of digitalised central bank money, which is referred to as Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). The ECB will probably launch the project for a digital euro in mid-July 2021.

“To be successful, the digital euro must do three things: It must be as easy for consumers to handle as cash. It must be viable in the long term for business enterprises, e.g. for automated machine-to-machine payments. And the digital euro must be well embedded in our delicately balanced, carefully secured and highly regulated European financial system because this system guarantees safe and fair access to financial and banking services for everyone in Europe”, notes Dr Joachim Schmalzl, executive member of the Board of Management of the German Savings Bank Association (DSGV), which is currently the lead coordinator for the German Banking Industry Committee.

In the opinion of the experts from Germany’s five national banking associations, issuing money should remain the responsibility of credit institutions in the proven two-tier banking system [my emphasis], even if the digital euro becomes legal tender like cash. For this reason, the ecosystem of digital money which they propose is made up of three key elements:

  • retail CBDC for private use
  • wholesale CBDC for commercial and savings banks
  • tokenised commercial bank money for use in industry

Retail CBDC issued by the central bank is to be used by private individuals in the euro area in the same way as cash for everyday payments, e.g. to retailers or government agencies. It should be possible to use the digital euro like cash, anonymously and offline. For this purpose, credit institutions will provide consumers in Europe with “CBDC wallets”, i.e. electronic wallets.

Wholesale CBDC issued by the central bank is to be used for the capital markets and interbank transfers. The GBIC’s experts are calling for this special form of the digital euro partly because, by adopting this approach, the ECB would be able to include further digitalisation of central bank accounts in its project. The ultimate aim is to achieve improvements which can benefit consumers, enterprises and also the banking sector.

Tokenised commercial bank money, which will be made available by commercial and savings banks, is to complement the two forms of digital central bank money, in particular to meet corporate demand arising from Industry 4.0 and the Internet of Things. Tokenised commercial bank money could facilitate transactions based on “smart” – i.e. automated – contracts and thus increase process efficiency.

“Increasing process digitalisation and automation will provide completely new opportunities for Europe’s enterprises. The banking sector is ready to provide new solutions for its corporate customers by issuing innovative forms of money. The ECB must define the necessary framework that will enable Europe’s banking sector and real economy to make reasonable use of the new opportunities”, Joachim Schmalzl observed on behalf of the GBIC.

I share the skepticism of DB research. And I can understand that banks prefer to maintain the two-tiered system while pushing for broader and more efficient payment options for their business clients.

“CBDC: State of Play, Practical Challenges, Open Issues,” SUERF Webinar, 2020

SUERF Webinar “CBDC: State of play, practical challenges, open issues” with Ulrich Bindseil (ECB) and Morten Bech (BIS). Moderated by Dirk Niepelt. December 4, 2020, 2 pm.

Central Banks Have Accepted a Future Retail CBDC

Recent indications:

Related recent developments:

“Monetäre Staatsfinanzierung mit Folgen (Monetary Financing of Government),” Die Volkswirtschaft, 2020

Die Volkswirtschaft, July 24 2020. PDF.

Clarifying the connections between outright monetary financing, QE, the distribution of seignorage profits, the relationship between fiscal and monetary policy, and central bank independence.

Abstract:

Wenn Parlamentarier höhere Gewinnausschüttungen der Nationalbank fordern, Kritiker im
Euroraum mehr «Quantitative Easing» oder Helikoptergeld verlangen und andere Stimmen
monetäre Staatsfinanzierung monieren, dann steht die Beziehung zwischen Geld- und
Fiskalpolitik zur Debatte. Eine Auslegeordnung.

“Wenn die Notenbank den Staat finanziert (When the Central Bank Finances the State),” FAS, 2020

FAS, 31 May 2020. PDF.

Monetary deficit financing is the norm—after all, central banks distribute their profits. Monetary financing occurs in the context of regular open market operations and QE and, hyper charged, with helicopter drops. The question is not whether monetary policy should finance the government, but why it does so, and to what extent. Fiscal and monetary policy are inherently connected; what constitutes monetary policy is defined by objectives.

The German Constitutional Court’s May 5, 2020 Verdict

The court’s press release: Beschlüsse der EZB zum Staatsanleihekaufprogramm kompetenzwidrig.

Critical discussion on Verfassungsblog by Alexander Thiele.

Critical Twitter thread by Jean-Pierre Landau.

Corinna Budras in the FAZ:

Viel größer sind die Bedenken über Kompetenzstreitigkeiten, die nun von Polen oder Ungarn angeführt werden könnten. Das wissen auch die Bundesverfassungsrichter, die diese Kritik in ihrem Urteil schon vorwegnehmen: Nur in absoluten, eng begrenzten Ausnahmefällen sei sie möglich, nämlich dann, wenn ein ausbrechender Rechtsakt” vorliege, der dazu führe, dass sich eine europäische Institution neue Kompetenzen schaffe, die ihr niemals übertragen worden seien und der deutsche Bürger dadurch in seinen Grundrechten verletzt werde. Konkret bedeutet das: Wenn sich Europa so ausbreitet, dass der demokratisch gewählte Bundestag nichts mehr zu sagen hat, steht das Bundesverfassungsgericht Gewehr bei Fuß.

Martin Wolf in the FT:

What can be done? … Or, the decision could be ignored. If a German court can ignore the ECJ, maybe the Bundesbank can ignore that court. … The EU could initiate an infringement proceeding against Germany. But its direct target would be the German government, which is caught between the EU organs on the one hand and the court on the other.

In the SZ, Wolfgang Janisch and Stefan Kornelius summarize an interview with one of the judges, Peter Michael Huber:

“Der Satz der Kommissionspräsidentin von der Leyen, das Europarecht gelte immer und ohne jede Einschränkung, ist, so gesehen, falsch”, sagte Huber in einem Interview der Süddeutschen Zeitung. “Auch die anderen Mitgliedstaaten kennen äußerste, an ihre Verfassungsidentität anknüpfende Grenzen, wo sie den Vorrang der nationalen Verfassungen vor dem Europarecht postulieren.” Das betreffe aber nur einen winzigen Teil des EU-Rechts.

… “Von der EZB verlangen wir nur, dass sie vor den Augen der Öffentlichkeit ihre Verantwortung übernimmt und auch begründet – auch gegenüber den Leuten, die Nachteile von ihren Maßnahmen haben.” Weder verlange das Gericht, das Anleihekaufprogramm zu unterlassen, noch mache es inhaltliche Vorgaben. “Wir wollen nur einen Nachweis, dass das noch innerhalb ihres Mandats ist.”

Nach Hubers Worten könnte man etwa eine Begründungspflicht in die EZB-Satzung aufnehmen. Und das Verhältnis zum EuGH ließe sich durch einen Mechanismus zur Konfliktschlichtung entschärfen. “Das Vernünftigste wäre, den Ball flach zu halten und zu überlegen, ob unser Urteil nicht doch ein paar richtige Punkte enthält.”

Michael Rasch in the NZZ:

Die Verfassungsrichter vermissten besonders eine Prüfung der Verhältnismässigkeit durch den EuGH. Die Luxemburger Richter hatten, wie auch die deutschen Verfassungsrichter, von der EZB die Verhältnismässigkeit der Massnahmen eingefordert, diese aber eben nicht analysiert.

On German TV, Frank Bräutigam interviews Andreas Voßkuhle.

(Updated repeatedly.)

Central Banks Zoom In on CBDC

According to a BIS press release, several leading central banks collaborate with the BIS on matters relating to the introduction of CBDC:

The Bank of Canada, the Bank of England, the Bank of Japan, the European Central Bank, the Sveriges Riksbank and the Swiss National Bank, together with the Bank for International Settlements (BIS), have created a group to share experiences as they assess the potential cases for central bank digital currency (CBDC) in their home jurisdictions.

The group will assess CBDC use cases; economic, functional and technical design choices, including cross-border interoperability; and the sharing of knowledge on emerging technologies. It will closely coordinate with the relevant institutions and forums – in particular, the Financial Stability Board and the Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructures (CPMI).

The group will be co-chaired by Benoît Cœuré, Head of the BIS Innovation Hub, and Jon Cunliffe, Deputy Governor of the Bank of England and Chair of the CPMI. It will include senior representatives of the participating institutions.

Climate Risk, Credit Risk, and ECB Collateral

In a CEP Discussion Note, Pierre Monnin argues that financial markets mis-price climate related credit risk. If this were corrected some securities held by the ECB would loose their investment grade credit rating.

Assessing climate risks requires methodologies based on forward-looking scenarios, on complex cause-and-effect linkages and on data that has not been observed in the past. Such models are at their infancy, but already offer meaningful insights. This note provides an overview of key components that such models are built on and illustrates them with examples of the analytics that are already available. It also applies one of the available methodologies to assess transition risk to the corporate bond holdings of the European Central Bank.

TIPS Goes Online

The ECB launches its Target Instant Payment Settlement (TIPS) system, which facilitates instant money transfers between banks and allows end users connected to those banks to make instant retail payments across the Euro zone.

Report in the FAZ. Last year’s report by Mehreen Khan in the FT.

From the ECB’s website:

TIPS was developed as an extension of TARGET2 and settles payments in central bank money. TIPS currently only settles payment transfers in euro. However, in case of demand other currencies could be supported as well. …

… a number of national solutions have been developed, or are under development, across the EU. A challenge for the Eurosystem is to ensure that these national solutions do not (re)introduce fragmentation … TIPS aims to minimise this risk by offering a service that can help ensure that any bank account holder in Europe can be reached. …

Participating payment service providers can set aside part of their liquidity on a dedicated account opened with their respective central bank, from which instant payments can be settled. It is only possible to add funds to TIPS accounts during TARGET2 opening hours.

As settlement in TIPS takes place in central bank money, participation in TIPS depends on being eligible to access central bank money. For this reason, in order to open an account in TIPS in euro, an institution needs to fulfil the same eligibility criteria as for participation in TARGET2.

Banks pay at most 0.2 cent per transaction during the first two years of operation.

See also the blog post on the Bank of England’s related, but different “interledger” program.

Central bank digital currency gets closer by the day …

Financial Sanctions, the USD, and the EUR

On Moneyness, JP Koning discusses the ability or not of the U.S. treasury to enforce financial sanctions overseas. Focusing on the Iran sanctions that ran from 2010 to 2015 (with strong international support) and are scheduled to be reimposed soon (without such support) Koning compares the U.S. sanctions regime to an exclusivity agreement that a large retailer imposes on a manufacturer.

Foreign banks in places like Europe were free to continue providing transactions services to Iran, but if they did so they would not be able to maintain correspondent accounts at U.S. banks. To ensure these rules were enforced, U.S. banks were to be fined and U.S. bank executives incarcerated if found guilty of providing accounts to offenders. Fearful bank executives were very quick to comply by carefully vetting those that they offered correspondent banking services to.

Having a U.S. correspondent account is very important to a non-US bank. If a European bank has a corporate customer who wants to make a U.S. dollar payment, the bank’s correspondent relationship with a U.S. bank allows it to effect that payment. Since the revenues from U.S. dollar payments far exceeds revenues from providing Iranian agencies and corporations with payments services, a typical European bank would have had no choice but to abandon Iran in order to keep its U.S. correspondent account.

But what would happen if Iran were to invoice in EUR rather than USD and make payments using an account at a European bank, bank X say, without direct links to the U.S. and no U.S. correspondent account? The answer to that question depends on whether the U.S. treasury would be prepared to sanction a third financial institution, bank Y say, that collaborates with bank X (or a business partner of bank X) and relies on a U.S. correspondent account. In the most extreme scenario bank Y would be the European Central Bank.

One scheme would be to set up a single sanctions-remote bank that conducts all Iranian business. To defang the U.S. Treasury’s threat “do business with us, or them, but not both!”, this bank should not be dependent on U.S. dollar business. Without a U.S. correspondent, the Treasury’s threat to disconnect it from the correspondent network packs no punch. … Crude oil buyers from all over Europe could have their banks wire payments to [bank X’s] account via the ECB’s large value payments sytem, Target2. [Bank X] could also open accounts for companies in India, China, and elsewhere who want to buy Iranian crude oil with euros.

… There is also the extreme possibility that the U.S. would impose travel bans on the ECB itself, in an effort to force ECB officials to remove [bank X] from Target2. Here is one such threat: “Treasury this week designated the governor of Iran’s central bank—does any European country think Treasury can’t designate their own central bank governor too?” Look, the idea of preventing Mario Draghi from travelling to the U.S., or blocking his U.S. assets, sounds so unhinged that it’s not even worth entertaining.

The reason Iran and its trading partners were not able to break sanctions between 2010 and 2015, according to Koning, is that Europe (specifically the German chancellor Angela Merkel) supported the U.S. administration and imposed its own sanctions on bank X, cutting it off the SWIFT and Target2 networks.

Redenomination Risk in the Eurozone

In a CEPR discussion paper Christian Bayer, Chi Kim, Alexander Kriwoluzky analyze redenomination risk during the European debt crisis and how the European Central Bank’s interventions affected this risk. They conclude that the risk fell in the case of Italy but increased for France and Germany.

From the abstract:

… first estimate daily default-risk-free yield curves for French, German, and Italian bonds that can be redenominated and for bonds that cannot. Then, we extract the compensation for redenomination risk from the yield spreads between these two types of bonds. Redenomination risk primarily shows up at the short end of yield curves. At the height of the euro crisis, spreads between first-year yields were close to 7% for Italy and up to -2% for Germany. The ECB’s interventions designed to reduce breakup risk successfully did so for Italy, but increased it for France and Germany.

See also this earlier blogpost.

ECB Bond Purchases: Fiscal or Monetary Policy?

In an NBER working paper, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen analyze which components of bond yields were affected by the European Central Bank’s government bond purchasing programs.

Given the institutional restrictions on monetary policy in the Euro area, the ECB had to carefully argue why it intervened in the first place. (To many, the case was obvious; the ECB intervention amounted to quasi-fiscal policy. But an intervention with this objective would not be covered by the rules of the Euro area.) It gave two reasons for the SMP, OMT, and LTRO:

The ECB has publicly stated that these policies reduce redenomination risk, i.e., the risk that the Eurozone might break up and countries redenominate domestic debt into new domestic currencies, and financial market “dysfunctionality,” i.e., segmentation- and illiquidity-induced pricing anomalies.

The authors decompose bond yields into five components: an expectations hypothesis component; a euro-rate term premium; a default risk premium; a redenomination risk premium; and a component due to sovereign bond market segmentation. To identify the non-observable, country-specific components (reflecting default risk, redenomination risk, and sovereign bond market segmentation), the authors use information from asset prices that are differentially exposed to these components.

Specifically, they use the fact that

foreign-law sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars cannot be redenominated through domestic law changes … and redenomination into a new currency should affect all securities issued in a given country under the country’s local law equally.

The authors find that

the default risk premium and sovereign bond segmentation effect appear to have been the dominant channels through which the SMP and the OMT affected sovereign bond yields of Italy and Spain. Redenomination risk may have been present at times and it may have been a third policy channel for the SMP and OMT in the case of Spain and Portugal, but not for Italy. … default risk accounts for 30% of the fall in yields across SMP and OMT for Italy. Segmentation accounts for the other 70%. For Spain, the numbers are 42% (default risk), 15% (redenomination risk) and 43% (segmentation). For Portugal, the numbers are 40% (default risk), 24% (redenomination risk) and 36% (segmentation). For the LTROs, we find that their effect on Spanish bond yields worked almost entirely via the sovereign segmentation channel. We show that the more substantial impact of the LTROs on Spanish sovereign yields than on Italian and Portuguese sovereign yields is consistent with Spanish banks purchasing a larger fraction of outstanding sovereign debt in the months following the introduction of the LTROs.