Recall this post from six years ago. Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor suggest that higher bank capital ratios help stabilize the financial system ex post but not ex ante, and that illiquidity breeds fragility.
In a CEPR discussion paper, Christoph Trebesch and Jeromin Zettelmeyer argue that
ECB bond buying had a large impact on the price of short and medium maturity bonds … However, the effects were limited to those sovereign bonds actually bought. We find little evidence for positive effects on market quality, or spillovers to close substitute bonds, CDS markets, or corporate bonds.
A multiple equilibria view of the crisis would probably suggest otherwise.
In a CEPR discussion paper, Òscar Jordà, Björn Richter, Moritz Schularick, and Alan M. Taylor suggest that higher bank capital ratios help stabilize the financial system ex post but not ex ante, and that illiquidity breeds fragility.
Abstract of their paper:
Higher capital ratios are unlikely to prevent a financial crisis. This is empirically true both for the entire history of advanced economies between 1870 and 2013 and for the post-WW2 period, and holds both within and between countries. We reach this startling conclusion using newly collected data on the liability side of banks’ balance sheets in 17 countries. A solvency indicator, the capital ratio has no value as a crisis predictor; but we find that liquidity indicators such as the loan-to-deposit ratio and the share of non-deposit funding do signal financial fragility, although they add little predictive power relative to that of credit growth on the asset side of the balance sheet. However, higher capital buffers have social benefits in terms of macro-stability: recoveries from financial crisis recessions are much quicker with higher bank capital.
In a paper, Larry Ball argues that
inadequate collateral and lack of legal authority were not the reasons that the Fed let Lehman fail. …
… the primary decision maker was Treasury Secretary Henry Paulson–even though he had no legal authority over the Fed’s lending decisions. … evidence supports the common theory that Paulson was influenced by the strong political opposition to financial rescues. … Another factor is that both Paulson and Fed officials, although worried about the effects of a Lehman failure, did not fully anticipate the damage that it would cause.
James Stewart comments in the New York Times.
Martin Hellwig argues in the Handelsblatt that the ECB should not cut Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Greek central bank. He makes the following points:
- In 2010, the ECB pressured Ireland to guarantee bank liabilities (vis-a-vis other European banks) by threatening to cut ELA. Such blackmailing is inconsistent with the ECB’s task to safeguard cash and payment systems.
- The same applies to Greece now. As lender of last resort, the ECB should provide funding to Greek banks even (or exactly) when they don’t have access to markets, as long as they are solvent. In principle, the banks may use central bank funding for whatever purpose they see fit; right now, however, the ECB has put restrictions on Greek banks’ purchases of Greek government bonds.
- Are the Greek banks solvent? There are certainly liquidity problems, due to heavy withdrawals triggered by fears that the Greek government may convert Euro into Drachma denominated deposits. Solvency problems are only very recent, due to the economic malaise.
At this point Hellwig stops arguing based on the European treaties.
- Instead, he suggests that the solvency rule could be waived in situations like currently in Greece or in Germany in 1931.
- He concedes that a freezing of ELA could be considered a precautionary measure against Grexit—an event that is not anticipated in the European treaties.
- But it could also be considered a measure that forces Greece into economic turmoil; the Greek banks into insolvency; and Greece out of the Euro area against its will.