Tag Archives: Seignorage

“Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC,” JF, 2024

Journal of Finance. HTML (local copy).

Abstract:

We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.

“Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC,” CEPR, 2023

CEPR Discussion Paper 18444, September 2023. HTML (local copy).

Abstract:

We analyze the role of retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) and reserves when banks exert deposit market power and liquidity transformation entails externalities. Optimal monetary architecture minimizes the social costs of liquidity provision and optimal monetary policy follows modified Friedman (1969) rules. Interest rates on reserves and CBDC should differ. Calibrations robustly suggest that CBDC provides liquidity more efficiently than deposits unless the central bank must refinance banks and this is very costly. Accordingly, the optimal share of CBDC in payments tends to exceed that of deposits.

“Money and Banking with Reserves and CBDC,” UniBe, 2022

UniBe Discussion Paper 22-12, October 2022. PDF.

We analyze retail central bank digital currency (CBDC) in a two-tier monetary system with bank deposit market power and externalities from liquidity transformation. Resource costs of liquidity provision determine the optimal monetary architecture and modified Friedman (1969) rules the optimal monetary policy. Optimal interest rates on reserves and CBDC differ. A calibration for the U.S. suggests a weak case for CBDC in the baseline but a much clearer case when too-big-to-fail banks, tax distortions or instrument restrictions are present. Depending on central bank choices CBDC raises U.S. bank funding costs by up to 1.5 percent of GDP.

“Unabhängigkeit der Nationalbank (Independence of the SNB),” FuW, 2020

Finanz und Wirtschaft, July 25, 2020. PDF.

The Swiss National Bank—yes, the Swiss one—feels it must remind politicians of its independence. Parliamentarians from left to right (!) voice demands. To shrink the SNB’s balance sheet? No, for more central bank profits to be distributed sooner rather than later.

I discuss misconceptions, possible motivations, and a constructive response. «The best way to defend the independence of a central bank is never to exercise it.»

Seignorage and Cantillon Effects in India

On Alt-M, Larry White discusses three aspects of the Indian “demonetization” experiment.

The transition from old notes blocks “honest” currency transactions, reduces income, and harms the poor who don’t have access to alternative means of payment. Because not all old notes will be redeemed, the transition into new notes will generate seignorage revenue for the government on the order of USD 40 billion, according to White’s estimates. Not all groups or industries get access to the new notes at the same time; this changes the terms of trade (Cantillon effects).

Rules Governing Payouts by Swiss National Bank

The Federal Council informs that the Federal Department of Finance and the Swiss National Bank have agreed on rules that govern how profits of the Swiss National Bank (SNB) will be paid out during the period 2016 to 2020:

Subject to a positive distribution reserve, the SNB will in future pay CHF 1 billion p.a. to the Confederation and cantons, as was previously the case. In future, however, omitted distributions will be compensated for in subsequent years if the distribution reserve allows this.

“Elektronisches Notenbankgeld ja, Vollgeld nein (Reserves for All, But no Sovereign Money),” NZZ, 2016

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, June 16, 2016. PDF, HTML. Ökonomenstimme, June 17, 2016. HTML.

  • Vollgeld seems attractive because it decouples the supply of money from intermediation. By enabling everyone to use legal tender for electronic payments, electronic base money would satisfy a need.
  • Vollgeld would prevent bank runs, at least partly; render deposit insurance unnecessary and reduce moral hazard; could help stabilize the credit cycle; and would redistribute seignorage to the central bank.
  • But these objectives can be obtained with less intrusive means.
  • Moreover, a Vollgeld system would be hard to enforce. Banks and their clients would establish new means of payment to circumvent the regulation. And in times of crisis, the central bank would feel obliged to provide liquidity assistance and bail outs.
  • The central problem is not that private money is used for transactions; it rather is that the money’s users rely on the central bank to guarantee the substitutability of private money and base money. In a democracy, the central bank cannot credibly let large parts of the payment system go under.
  • A sudden, forceful change of regime does not offer a credible way out of this trap.
  • But letting the general public access central bank reserves without abolishing private money from one day to the other may open a path towards a new arrangement where the public learns to distinguish between private and base money and where only the latter is publicly guaranteed.

The Swiss “Vollgeldinitiative”

On June 3, 2014 the Swiss group “Monetäre Modernisierung” (monetary modernisation) started to collect signatures with the aim to force a national referendum on changes to the Swiss constitution. (The group needs to collect 100,000 signatures within an 18 month period in order to succeed.) The referendum would put the “Vollgeldinitiative” (sovereign money initiative) to vote, an initiative that seeks to fundamentally change Switzerland’s monetary system. The group “Monetäre Modernisierung” is part of a broader international movement with partner groups in the UK, the European Union and the US.

According to the proposal, deposit claims vis-a-vis commercial banks would be transformed into claims vis-a-vis the central bank and deposit liabilities of commercial banks would be transformed into liabilities of those banks vis-a-vis the central bank. Within a certain time span, commercial banks would have to repay those liabilities. Moreover, they would be prohibited from ever creating deposits again—that is, all money should be base money. The proposal envisions the Swiss National Bank to bring new base money into circulation by transferring reserves to the treasury, allowing the government to partly finance its expenditures by means of “original seignorage,” or to citizens. The Swiss National Bank could also lend reserves to banks, against interest, to accommodate fluctuations in money demand. (The resulting interest seignorage would add to government revenues as well.) The initiative aims at a complete separation between money and debt; accordingly, base money would be booked as equity in the central bank’s balance sheet rather than debt.

The proposal goes further than Irving Fisher’s 100% money plan and other proposals for full-reserve banking (and narrow banking) where banks are required to keep the full amount of deposited funds in cash/reserves (or very liquid, safe assets). Under the “Vollgeldinitiative,” the amount of deposited funds does not only have to be kept in cash/reserves but deposits are abolished altogether.

Some background information (in German):

  • The text of the proposed constitutional amendment, with explanations.
  • Background paper by one of the intellectual father’s of the initiative, Joseph Huber. He explains that the name “Vollgeld” is the short form of “voll gültiges gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel,” or legally speaking, “unbeschränktes gesetzliches Zahlungsmittel.”

Some quotes from the Q&A section on the technical implementation of the proposed reform (in German):

Die Girokonten der Kunden werden aus der Bankenbilanz herausgelöst und separat als Vollgeldkonten geführt. Die Guthaben auf den Girokonten bleiben eins zu eins bestehen, werden Vollgeld und somit zu gesetzlichen Zahlungsmitteln gleich Münzen und Banknoten. Ab dann ist nur noch die Nationalbank autorisiert Zahlungsmittel zu schöpfen. Dadurch geschieht mit dem unbaren Giralgeld heute das gleiche wie vor hundert Jahren mit den Banknoten. …

Das bisherige Banken-Giralgeld wird von Gesetzes wegen zu Vollgeld umdeklariert. Liesse man es dabei bewenden, kämen die Banken mit einem Schlag in den Besitz von Vollgeld, obwohl sie nicht das (neue) Vollgeld, sondern nur das (alte) Giralgeld geschaffen haben. Deshalb übernimmt die Nationalbank im Moment der Umstellung alle bisherigen Giralgeld-Verbindlichkeiten der Banken und verpflichtet sich damit, den Bankkunden anstelle von Bankengiralgeld Vollgeld auszuzahlen. Diese Auszahlung erfolgt sofort, damit die umlaufende Geldmenge nicht vermindert wird, und sie erfolgt auf Geldkonten ausserhalb der Bankbilanz, also auf Konten, auf die die Bank keinen Zugriff mehr hat. Für die Bankkunden ist diese Umstellung äusserst relevant: Sie sind jetzt im persönlichen Besitz von gesetzlichem Zahlungsmittel in der Höhe der bisherigen Sichtkonten, die vor der Umstellung blosse Geldversprechen auf Konten der Bank, aber kein Geld waren. …

Nach der Vollgeld-Umstellung gibt es nur noch Nationalbank-Geld. Das elektronische Geld ist genauso vollwertiges Geld wie heute Münzen und Banknoten. Das heisst, die Vollgeld-Zahlungsverkehrskonten der Kunden befinden sich dann nicht mehr in der Bilanz der Banken, sondern diese werden von Banken wie heute Wertpapierdepots verwaltet. Das Geld auf dem Konto gehört nur dem Kunden, wie das Bargeld im Tresor, und ist nicht mehr wie heute, eine Forderung an die Bank. So hat auch der Zahlungsverkehr nichts mehr mit Forderungen und Verpflichtungen zwischen den Banken zu tun, weshalb das heute übliche Banken-Clearing unnötig wird. Wenn ein Kunde eine Überweisung an einen Kunden tätigt, wird einfach Vollgeld von einem Konto auf das andere transferiert. Es passiert dann das, was fast alle Menschen heute meinen, was bei einer Überweisung geschieht.
Diese direkte digitale Übertragung von Vollgeld vereinfacht den Zahlungsverkehr, da die bisherige komplizierte Verrechnung von Forderungen und Verbindlichkeiten zwischen den Banken und eventueller Ausgleich mit Nationalbank-Guthaben entfällt. Statt dessen können Überweisungen sofort ausgeführt und gebucht werden, genauso wie heute der Kauf von Aktien und Wertpapieren. Die bisherige Wartezeit von mehreren Tagen, bis das Geld ankommt, entfällt. Nach wenigen Minuten wird man den Geldeingang auf dem Konto sehen können.

I discuss the initiative here.

“Vollgeld, Liquidität und Stabilität (100% Money, Liquidity and Stability),” NZZ, 2014

Neue Zürcher Zeitung, May 12, 2014. PDF. Extended version in Ökonomenstimme, May 13, 2014. HTML.

  • A 100% money regime reduces the risk of credit bubbles, but requires more and better fine-tuning by the central bank.
  • Central banks can already implement higher reserve requirements. If the fact that they don’t reflects policy failure, then the 100% money proposal risks handing more power to one source of the problem.
  • A 100% money regime increases financial stability, at least temporarily, but it forces banks to find new sources of funding and lowers the interest rate for depositors, which is fine.
  • If lender of last resort support by the central bank occurs at too low interest rates then seignorage revenues are privatised and costs socialised under the current regime. Moving to a 100% money regime would help but so would simple Pigouvian taxation.
  • How can a 100% money regime be enforced if market participants end up coordinating to use other securities than deposits as means of payment?
  • More stable deposits in a 100% money regime do not imply a more stable banking system unless other regulation is imposed that completely prevents “maturity transformation.”
  • Aggregate liquidity cannot be created out of nothing, with or without deposit insurance.
  • Societies have to take a stand on whether they want to guarantee broader monetary aggregates than base money. If so, the cost of the guarantee should be privatised. Problems arise if societies pretend not to provide such guarantees but central banks nevertheless feel obliged to step in ex post and market participants are aware of that fact ex ante; bad, self-fulfilling equilibria are the consequence.
  • Commitment on the part of policy makers is key; it requires independent central bankers and regulators.