Tag Archives: Confidentiality

Fabio Panetta on the Digital Euro

In a speech, the ECB’s Fabio Panetta argues that a digital Euro is necessary because

[i]n the digital age … banknotes could lose their role as a reference value in payments, undermining the integrity of the monetary system. Central banks must therefore consider how to ensure that their money can remain a payments anchor in a digital world.

He argues that

outsourcing the provision of central bank money [to stable coin providers] … would endanger monetary sovereignty [as would the absence of a national digital currency].

Panetta also argues that a digital Euro could

  • improve the confidentiality of digital payments and
  • increase choice and reduce costs

and should

  • avoid interfering with the functioning of the financial system and
  • be available within private payment solutions.

Panetta does not discuss

  • seignorage and
  • time consistency motivations.

How China Lends

In a CEPR discussion paper, Anna Gelpern, Sebastian Horn, Scott Morris, Brad Parks, and Christoph Trebesch document “How China Lends: A Rare Look into 100 Debt Contracts with Foreign Governments:”

China is the world’s largest official creditor, but we lack basic facts about the terms and conditions of its lending. … We collect and analyze 100 contracts between Chinese state-owned entities and government borrowers in 24 developing countries … First, the Chinese contracts contain unusual confidentiality clauses that bar borrowers from revealing the terms or even the existence of the debt. Second, Chinese lenders seek advantage over other creditors, using collateral arrangements such as lender-controlled revenue accounts and promises to keep the debt out of collective restructuring (“no Paris Club” clauses). Third, cancellation, acceleration, and stabilization clauses in Chinese contracts potentially allow the lenders to influence debtors’ domestic and foreign policies. Even if these terms were unenforceable in court, the mix of confidentiality, seniority, and policy influence could limit the sovereign debtor’s crisis management options and complicate debt renegotiation. Overall, the contracts use creative design to manage credit risks and overcome enforcement hurdles, presenting China as a muscular and commercially-savvy lender to the developing world.

Chinese commentary on the paper in the Global Times.

Zcash

The Economist reports about a new digital currency platform, Zcash. The platform could handle more transactions than for example, Bitcoin. The open-source project backed by outside investors offers confidentiality:

Bitcoin obscures the identity of currency owners, but the “blockchain”, the ledger that keeps track of all the coins, is open and can be analysed to see the flows of funds. This is a serious barrier for banks: blockchains could reveal their trading strategies and information about their customers. Zcash, by contrast, shields transactions from prying eyes with a scheme based on “zero-knowledge proofs” (hence the “Z” in its name). These are cryptographic protocols proving that a statement (who owns coins, for instance) is true without revealing any other information (how many and where the money came from). And it is by selling this technology—called “zk-SNARK” (don’t ask)—to banks that Zcash, the company, wants to earn its keep.