Tag Archives: Bubble

“Digital Money, Payments and Banks,” CEPR/IESE Report, 2020

Discussion of Antonio Fatás’ chapter in Elena Carletti, Stijn Claessens, Antonio Fatás, Xavier Vives, The Bank Business Model in the Post-Covid-19 World, CEPR/IESE report, London, June 2020. PDF.

Antonio’s chapter offers a rich overview of the dramatic changes in the world of money and banking that we have seen in recent years. I focus on two themes: the nature of money and how it relates to these developments, and the government’s response to the structural changes we observe.

I discuss the price of money, its fundamental value, store-of-value bubble, and liquidity bubble components; the opaque legal tender concept and the absurd situation that governments outlaw the use of government money (contrary to what some theories would imply); the role of trust in a world without cash; and the substitution of money by smart contracts tied to a database.

And I comment on the many facets of digitalization; the time lag between the origination of new business models and regulatory catch-up; and on central bank digital currency as a key element of structural change in the financial system.

“On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money,” JME, 2019

Journal of Monetary Economics, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF.

When does a swap between private and public money leave the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged? To answer this question, the paper sets up a generic model of money and liquidity which identifies sources of seignorage rents and liquidity bubbles. We derive sufficient conditions for equivalence and apply them in the context of the “Chicago Plan”, cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Our results imply that CBDC coupled with central bank pass-through funding need not imply a credit crunch nor undermine financial stability.

“On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money,” JME, 2019

Accepted for publication in the Journal of Monetary Economics, with Markus Brunnermeier. (NBER wp.)

When does a swap between private and public money leave the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged? To answer this question, the paper sets up a generic model of money and liquidity which identifies sources of seignorage rents and liquidity bubbles. We derive sufficient conditions for equivalence and apply them in the context of the “Chicago Plan”, cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). Our results imply that CBDC coupled with central bank pass-through funding need not imply a credit crunch nor undermine financial stability.

“On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money,” CEPR, 2019

CEPR Discussion Paper 13778, June 2019, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. (Local copy of NBER wp.)

We develop a generic model of money and liquidity that identifies sources of liquidity bubbles and seignorage rents. We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of monies leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged. We apply the equivalence result to the “Chicago Plan,” cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). In particular, we show why CBDC need not undermine financial stability.

“On the Equivalence of Private and Public Money,” NBER, 2019

NBER Working Paper 25877, May 2019, with Markus Brunnermeier. PDF. (Local copy.)

We develop a generic model of money and liquidity that identifies sources of liquidity bubbles and seignorage rents. We provide sufficient conditions under which a swap of monies leaves the equilibrium allocation and price system unchanged. We apply the equivalence result to the “Chicago Plan,” cryptocurrencies, the Indian de-monetization experiment, and Central Bank Digital Currency (CBDC). In particular, we show why CBDC need not undermine financial stability.