In the FT, Mehreen Khan and Aliya Ram report that MasterCard and IBM plan to create a “data trust” to allow businesses with EU customers to meet the strict General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) provisions that come into effect by the end of May. “Truata” will be based in Dublin.
The independent company, called Truata, will manage, anonymise and analyse vast amounts of personal information held by companies such as travel agents and insurers in a way that is compliant under the EU’s General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). …
Truata will strip data sets of key details such as a person’s name, contact details or email address so they cannot be re-identified from the information. It will also offer analytical services to allow a business to extract valuable information from the data.
In an NBER working paper, Niels Johannesen, Patrick Langetieg, Daniel Reck, Max Risch, and Joel Slemrod discuss the effects of recent U.S. tax enforcement initiatives on tax compliance. They offer background information about U.S. initiatives since 2009 and conclude, based on administrative microdata, that
[e]nforcement caused approximately 60,000 individuals to disclose offshore accounts with a combined value of around $120 billion. Most disclosures happened outside offshore voluntary disclosure programs by individuals who never admitted prior noncompliance. The disclosed accounts were concentrated in countries whose institutions facilitate tax evasion. The enforcement-driven disclosures increased annual reported capital income by $2.5-$4 billion corresponding to $0.7-$1.0 billion in additional tax revenue.
This paper reviews theoretical results on financial policy. We use basic accounting identities to illustrate relations between gross assets and liabilities, net debt positions and the appropriation of (primary) budget surplus funds. We then discuss Ramsey policies, answering the question how a committed government may use financial instruments to pursue its objectives. Finally, we discuss additional roles for financial policy that arise as a consequence of political frictions, in particular lack of commitment.
In an NBER working paper, Arvind Krishnamurthy, Stefan Nagel, and Annette Vissing-Jorgensen analyze which components of bond yields were affected by the European Central Bank’s government bond purchasing programs.
Given the institutional restrictions on monetary policy in the Euro area, the ECB had to carefully argue why it intervened in the first place. (To many, the case was obvious; the ECB intervention amounted to quasi-fiscal policy. But an intervention with this objective would not be covered by the rules of the Euro area.) It gave two reasons for the SMP, OMT, and LTRO:
The ECB has publicly stated that these policies reduce redenomination risk, i.e., the risk that the Eurozone might break up and countries redenominate domestic debt into new domestic currencies, and financial market “dysfunctionality,” i.e., segmentation- and illiquidity-induced pricing anomalies.
The authors decompose bond yields into five components: an expectations hypothesis component; a euro-rate term premium; a default risk premium; a redenomination risk premium; and a component due to sovereign bond market segmentation. To identify the non-observable, country-specific components (reflecting default risk, redenomination risk, and sovereign bond market segmentation), the authors use information from asset prices that are differentially exposed to these components.
Specifically, they use the fact that
foreign-law sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars cannot be redenominated through domestic law changes … and redenomination into a new currency should affect all securities issued in a given country under the country’s local law equally.
The authors find that
the default risk premium and sovereign bond segmentation effect appear to have been the dominant channels through which the SMP and the OMT affected sovereign bond yields of Italy and Spain. Redenomination risk may have been present at times and it may have been a third policy channel for the SMP and OMT in the case of Spain and Portugal, but not for Italy. … default risk accounts for 30% of the fall in yields across SMP and OMT for Italy. Segmentation accounts for the other 70%. For Spain, the numbers are 42% (default risk), 15% (redenomination risk) and 43% (segmentation). For Portugal, the numbers are 40% (default risk), 24% (redenomination risk) and 36% (segmentation). For the LTROs, we find that their effect on Spanish bond yields worked almost entirely via the sovereign segmentation channel. We show that the more substantial impact of the LTROs on Spanish sovereign yields than on Italian and Portuguese sovereign yields is consistent with Spanish banks purchasing a larger fraction of outstanding sovereign debt in the months following the introduction of the LTROs.
In the NZZ, Daniel Imwinkelried reports about the effect of cost pressure on the organizational structure of banks: fewer layers of control.
So bestand das Schweizer Privatkundengeschäft der Credit Suisse (CS) bis vor kurzem aus drei Ebenen, nämlich zehn Regionen, den Marktgebieten und den Teams. Die mittlere Stufe wurde abgeschafft, die ehemaligen Chefs mussten die Bank verlassen oder erhielten eine neue Aufgabe. Im Schweizer Privatkundengeschäft der CS kamen einst im Durchschnitt auf einen Vorgesetzten 4,2 Mitarbeiter; nun strebt die Bank ein Verhältnis von 1 zu 7 an. Damit ziele man auf eine schlagkräftigere Führung, sagte jüngst Serge Fehr, der Leiter des Privatkundenbereichs, an einem Anlass.
ECB bond buying had a large impact on the price of short and medium maturity bonds … However, the effects were limited to those sovereign bonds actually bought. We find little evidence for positive effects on market quality, or spillovers to close substitute bonds, CDS markets, or corporate bonds.
A multiple equilibria view of the crisis would probably suggest otherwise.
In the NZZ, Peter Fischer reports that SNB president Thomas Jordan rejects the Vollgeld initiative and stops short of endorsing the ‘reserves for all’ proposal.
… wehrt sich die Nationalbank auch gegen Vorschläge aus akademischen Kreisen, die von der Nationalbank fordern, nicht mehr nur Banken, sondern auch direkt den Schweizer Bürgern elektronisches Zentralbankgeld zur Verfügung zu stellen. Am einfachsten ginge dies, wenn jedermann bei der SNB ein Konto halten könnte. Jordan warnt davor, dass in einem solchen Fall die bewährte Arbeitsteilung zwischen Privatsektor und Zentralbank zur Disposition stünde. Die Fähigkeit der Banken, Kredite zu vergeben und Fristentransformation zu betreiben, würde eingeschränkt. Das Finanzsystem würde als Ganzes nicht sicherer, sondern unter Umständen sogar stärker destabilisiert, wenn es allen Anlegern möglich wäre, nach Belieben plötzlich in Sichtguthaben bei der Zentralbank zu flüchten. Zudem müsste die SNB etwa bei der Überprüfung der Kunden und ihrer Gelder neu Funktionen übernehmen, die sie bei den Banken besser aufgehoben sieht.
Allerdings konzediert auch Jordan, dass sich die technologischen Möglichkeiten im Bereich des digitalen Geldes rasant weiterentwickeln. Das hat das Potenzial, Zahlungssysteme und die Art, wie die Zentralbank ihre Geldpolitik betreiben kann, zu verändern. Jordan hielt in seiner Rede dazu lediglich fest, die SNB verfolge die Entwicklungen aufmerksam. Noch sind Kryptowährungen zu wenig verbreitet, um aus Sicht der Nationalbank ein ernsthaftes Problem darzustellen. Der E-Franken muss warten.
It is correct that ‘reserves for all’ could increase the elasticity of demand for reserves; if unchecked, this could also increase the risk of bank runs. But the central bank would not have to interact with the general public. And the fact that monetary reform would change the banking business is no decisive argument against such a change.
In the FT, Leslie Hook reports that activist investors want Apple
to address concerns over smartphone addiction and the mental health effects of phone use among children.
They refer to psychologist Jean Twenge according to whom teenagers today (“the iGen”)
… are more vulnerable than Millennials were: Rates of teen depression and suicide have skyrocketed since 2011. It’s not an exaggeration to describe iGen as being on the brink of the worst mental-health crisis in decades. Much of this deterioration can be traced to their phones. …
12th-graders in 2015 were going out less often than eighth-graders did as recently as 2009. …
Teens who spend more time than average on screen activities are more likely to be unhappy, and those who spend more time than average on nonscreen activities are more likely to be happy. There’s not a single exception. All screen activities are linked to less happiness, and all nonscreen activities are linked to more happiness.
The last observation does not hold in the cross section, however; more “social” teenagers spend more time with friends both online and offline.
In a paper, Reto Föllmi and Isabel Martínez document trends in income and wealth inequality in Switzerland over the last 100 years.
Daniel Hug reports in the NZZaS (figures below taken from NZZaS).
Data (World Wealth and Income Database, based on tax records).
Income inequality has been rather stable and is modest …
… although social mobility as reflected in educational attainment is low.
Income inequality at the very top has increased.
The top 1% of income recipients earn at least CHF 300 000 annually (net income before tax), the top 0.01% at least CHF 4 million.
Wealth is distributed much more unequally. The top 1% own roughly 40%, slightly more than in the United States and twice as much as in France and the UK.
The wealth distribution is more equal if retirement savings in the second and third pillar are accounted for. PAYG funded pensions (first pillar) also contribute towards reducing inequality after taxes and transfers, much more so than taxes.
In Der Bund, Adrian Sulc comments on the Swiss National Bank’s perfectionism.
Keine andere Schweizer Organisation kommuniziert so professionell wie die SNB, keine andere Organisation kann so gut dichthalten.
Perfectionism is costly.
Der Personalbestand ist in den letzten fünf Jahren um 18 Prozent auf 795 Vollzeitstellen gestiegen. … Die durchschnittlichen Lohnkosten pro Mitarbeiter betragen mittlerweile 155 000 Franken pro Jahr. Dies weil gemäss Nationalbank fast ausschliesslich Spezialisten aus Wirtschaft und IT eingestellt wurden.